#ifdef I_SHADOW
/* Shadow password support for solaris - pdo@cs.umd.edu
* Not just Solaris: at least HP-UX, IRIX, Linux.
- * the API is from SysV. --jhi */
-#ifdef __hpux__
+ * The API is from SysV.
+ *
+ * There are at least two more shadow interfaces,
+ * see the comments in pp_gpwent().
+ *
+ * --jhi */
+# ifdef __hpux__
/* There is a MAXINT coming from <shadow.h> <- <hpsecurity.h> <- <values.h>
* and another MAXINT from "perl.h" <- <sys/param.h>. */
-#undef MAXINT
-#endif
-#include <shadow.h>
+# undef MAXINT
+# endif
+# include <shadow.h>
#endif
/* XXX If this causes problems, set i_unistd=undef in the hint file. */
#endif
#if !defined(PERL_EFF_ACCESS_R_OK) && defined(HAS_EACCESS)
-# if defined(I_SYS_SECURITY)
+# ifdef I_SYS_SECURITY
# include <sys/security.h>
# endif
# ifdef ACC_SELF
EXTEND(SP, 1);
PERL_FLUSHALL_FOR_CHILD;
childpid = PerlProc_fork();
+ if (childpid == -1)
+ RETSETUNDEF;
PUSHi(childpid);
RETURN;
# else
}
}
PERL_FLUSHALL_FOR_CHILD;
-#if (defined(HAS_FORK) || defined(AMIGAOS)) && !defined(VMS) && !defined(OS2)
+#if (defined(HAS_FORK) || defined(AMIGAOS)) && !defined(VMS) && !defined(OS2) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) || defined(PERL_MICRO)
if (PerlProc_pipe(pp) >= 0)
did_pipes = 1;
while ((childpid = vfork()) == -1) {
if (childpid > 0) {
if (did_pipes)
PerlLIO_close(pp[1]);
+#ifndef PERL_MICRO
rsignal_save(SIGINT, SIG_IGN, &ihand);
rsignal_save(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN, &qhand);
+#endif
do {
result = wait4pid(childpid, &status, 0);
} while (result == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+#ifndef PERL_MICRO
(void)rsignal_restore(SIGINT, &ihand);
(void)rsignal_restore(SIGQUIT, &qhand);
+#endif
STATUS_NATIVE_SET(result == -1 ? -1 : status);
do_execfree(); /* free any memory child malloced on vfork */
SP = ORIGMARK;
SV *tsv;
if (!tmbuf)
RETPUSHUNDEF;
- tsv = Perl_newSVpvf(aTHX_ "%s %s %2"IVdf" %02"IVdf":%02"IVdf":%02"IVdf" %"IVdf,
+ tsv = Perl_newSVpvf(aTHX_ "%s %s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d %d",
dayname[tmbuf->tm_wday],
monname[tmbuf->tm_mon],
- (IV)tmbuf->tm_mday,
- (IV)tmbuf->tm_hour,
- (IV)tmbuf->tm_min,
- (IV)tmbuf->tm_sec,
- (IV)tmbuf->tm_year + 1900);
+ tmbuf->tm_mday,
+ tmbuf->tm_hour,
+ tmbuf->tm_min,
+ tmbuf->tm_sec,
+ tmbuf->tm_year + 1900);
PUSHs(sv_2mortal(tsv));
}
else if (tmbuf) {
#ifdef HAS_PASSWD
I32 which = PL_op->op_type;
register SV *sv;
- struct passwd *pwent;
STRLEN n_a;
-#if defined(HAS_GETSPENT) || defined(HAS_GETSPNAM)
- struct spwd *spwent = NULL;
-#endif
+ struct passwd *pwent = NULL;
+ /*
+ * We currently support only the SysV getsp* shadow password interface.
+ * The interface is declared in <shadow.h> and often one needs to link
+ * with -lsecurity or some such.
+ * This interface is used at least by Solaris, HP-UX, IRIX, and Linux.
+ * (and SCO?)
+ *
+ * AIX getpwnam() is clever enough to return the encrypted password
+ * only if the caller (euid?) is root.
+ *
+ * There are at least two other shadow password APIs. Many platforms
+ * seem to contain more than one interface for accessing the shadow
+ * password databases, possibly for compatibility reasons.
+ * The getsp*() is by far he simplest one, the other two interfaces
+ * are much more complicated, but also very similar to each other.
+ *
+ * <sys/types.h>
+ * <sys/security.h>
+ * <prot.h>
+ * struct pr_passwd *getprpw*();
+ * The password is in
+ * char getprpw*(...).ufld.fd_encrypt[]
+ * Mention HAS_GETPRPWNAM here so that Configure probes for it.
+ *
+ * <sys/types.h>
+ * <sys/security.h>
+ * <prot.h>
+ * struct es_passwd *getespw*();
+ * The password is in
+ * char *(getespw*(...).ufld.fd_encrypt)
+ * Mention HAS_GETESPWNAM here so that Configure probes for it.
+ *
+ * Mention I_PROT here so that Configure probes for it.
+ *
+ * In HP-UX for getprpw*() the manual page claims that one should include
+ * <hpsecurity.h> instead of <sys/security.h>, but that is not needed
+ * if one includes <shadow.h> as that includes <hpsecurity.h>,
+ * and pp_sys.c already includes <shadow.h> if there is such.
+ *
+ * Note that <sys/security.h> is already probed for, but currently
+ * it is only included in special cases.
+ *
+ * In Digital UNIX/Tru64 if using the getespw*() (which seems to be
+ * be preferred interface, even though also the getprpw*() interface
+ * is available) one needs to link with -lsecurity -ldb -laud -lm.
+ * One also needs to call set_auth_parameters() in main() before
+ * doing anything else, whether one is using getespw*() or getprpw*().
+ *
+ * Note that accessing the shadow databases can be magnitudes
+ * slower than accessing the standard databases.
+ *
+ * --jhi
+ */
- if (which == OP_GPWNAM)
- pwent = getpwnam(POPpx);
- else if (which == OP_GPWUID)
- pwent = getpwuid(POPi);
- else
-#ifdef HAS_GETPWENT
- pwent = (struct passwd *)getpwent();
-#else
+ switch (which) {
+ case OP_GPWNAM:
+ pwent = getpwnam(POPpx);
+ break;
+ case OP_GPWUID:
+ pwent = getpwuid((Uid_t)POPi);
+ break;
+ case OP_GPWENT:
+# ifdef HAS_GETPWENT
+ pwent = getpwent();
+# else
DIE(aTHX_ PL_no_func, "getpwent");
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAS_GETSPNAM
- if (which == OP_GPWNAM) {
- if (pwent)
- spwent = getspnam(pwent->pw_name);
- }
-# ifdef HAS_GETSPUID /* AFAIK there isn't any anywhere. --jhi */
- else if (which == OP_GPWUID) {
- if (pwent)
- spwent = getspnam(pwent->pw_name);
+# endif
+ break;
}
-# endif
-# ifdef HAS_GETSPENT
- else
- spwent = (struct spwd *)getspent();
-# endif
-#endif
EXTEND(SP, 10);
if (GIMME != G_ARRAY) {
PUSHs(sv = sv_newmortal());
if (pwent) {
if (which == OP_GPWNAM)
-#if Uid_t_sign <= 0
+# if Uid_t_sign <= 0
sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_uid);
-#else
+# else
sv_setuv(sv, (UV)pwent->pw_uid);
-#endif
+# endif
else
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_name);
}
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_name);
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
-#ifdef PWPASSWD
-# if defined(HAS_GETSPENT) || defined(HAS_GETSPNAM)
- if (spwent)
- sv_setpv(sv, spwent->sp_pwdp);
- else
- sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_passwd);
-# else
- sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_passwd);
+ SvPOK_off(sv);
+ /* If we have getspnam(), we try to dig up the shadow
+ * password. If we are underprivileged, the shadow
+ * interface will set the errno to EACCES or similar,
+ * and return a null pointer. If this happens, we will
+ * use the dummy password (usually "*" or "x") from the
+ * standard password database.
+ *
+ * In theory we could skip the shadow call completely
+ * if euid != 0 but in practice we cannot know which
+ * security measures are guarding the shadow databases
+ * on a random platform.
+ *
+ * Resist the urge to use additional shadow interfaces.
+ * Divert the urge to writing an extension instead.
+ *
+ * --jhi */
+# ifdef HAS_GETSPNAM
+ {
+ struct spwd *spwent;
+ int saverrno; /* Save and restore errno so that
+ * underprivileged attempts seem
+ * to have never made the unsccessful
+ * attempt to retrieve the shadow password. */
+
+ saverrno = errno;
+ spwent = getspnam(pwent->pw_name);
+ errno = saverrno;
+ if (spwent && spwent->sp_pwdp)
+ sv_setpv(sv, spwent->sp_pwdp);
+ }
# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef INCOMPLETE_TAINTS
- /* passwd is tainted because user himself can diddle with it. */
+ if (!SvPOK(sv)) /* Use the standard password, then. */
+ sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_passwd);
+
+# ifndef INCOMPLETE_TAINTS
+ /* passwd is tainted because user himself can diddle with it.
+ * admittedly not much and in a very limited way, but nevertheless. */
SvTAINTED_on(sv);
-#endif
+# endif
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
-#if Uid_t_sign <= 0
+# if Uid_t_sign <= 0
sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_uid);
-#else
+# else
sv_setuv(sv, (UV)pwent->pw_uid);
-#endif
+# endif
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
-#if Uid_t_sign <= 0
+# if Uid_t_sign <= 0
sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_gid);
-#else
+# else
sv_setuv(sv, (UV)pwent->pw_gid);
-#endif
- /* pw_change, pw_quota, and pw_age are mutually exclusive. */
+# endif
+ /* pw_change, pw_quota, and pw_age are mutually exclusive--
+ * because of the poor interface of the Perl getpw*(),
+ * not because there's some standard/convention saying so.
+ * A better interface would have been to return a hash,
+ * but we are accursed by our history, alas. --jhi. */
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
-#ifdef PWCHANGE
+# ifdef PWCHANGE
sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_change);
-#else
-# ifdef PWQUOTA
- sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_quota);
# else
-# ifdef PWAGE
+# ifdef PWQUOTA
+ sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_quota);
+# else
+# ifdef PWAGE
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_age);
+# endif
# endif
# endif
-#endif
- /* pw_class and pw_comment are mutually exclusive. */
+ /* pw_class and pw_comment are mutually exclusive--.
+ * see the above note for pw_change, pw_quota, and pw_age. */
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
-#ifdef PWCLASS
+# ifdef PWCLASS
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_class);
-#else
-# ifdef PWCOMMENT
+# else
+# ifdef PWCOMMENT
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_comment);
+# endif
# endif
-#endif
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
-#ifdef PWGECOS
+# ifdef PWGECOS
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_gecos);
-#endif
-#ifndef INCOMPLETE_TAINTS
+# endif
+# ifndef INCOMPLETE_TAINTS
/* pw_gecos is tainted because user himself can diddle with it. */
SvTAINTED_on(sv);
-#endif
+# endif
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_dir);
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
sv_setpv(sv, pwent->pw_shell);
-#ifndef INCOMPLETE_TAINTS
+# ifndef INCOMPLETE_TAINTS
/* pw_shell is tainted because user himself can diddle with it. */
SvTAINTED_on(sv);
-#endif
+# endif
-#ifdef PWEXPIRE
+# ifdef PWEXPIRE
PUSHs(sv = sv_mortalcopy(&PL_sv_no));
sv_setiv(sv, (IV)pwent->pw_expire);
-#endif
+# endif
}
RETURN;
#else
djSP;
#if defined(HAS_PASSWD) && defined(HAS_SETPWENT)
setpwent();
-# ifdef HAS_SETSPENT
- setspent();
-# endif
RETPUSHYES;
#else
DIE(aTHX_ PL_no_func, "setpwent");
djSP;
#if defined(HAS_PASSWD) && defined(HAS_ENDPWENT)
endpwent();
-# ifdef HAS_ENDSPENT
- endspent();
-# endif
RETPUSHYES;
#else
DIE(aTHX_ PL_no_func, "endpwent");
projects / p5sagit/p5-mst-13.2.git / blobdiff